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Abstract. We claim that the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) Order of Rights Object Evaluation 
algorithm causes the loss of execution permissions under certain circumstances. By introducing 
an algebraic characterization, as well as an ordering on licenses, we redesign this algorithm to 
minimize possible errors, in a way suitable for the low computational powers of mobile 
devices. Our algorithm does not suggest major changes of the existing system, hence its future 
implementation will have minimal development cost. In addition we provide a formal proof 
that our algorithm minimizes the above problem. The proof is conducted using the 
OTS/CafeOBJ method for verifying liveness properties. 
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1   Introduction 
Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) is an organization responsible for the definition of 
standards for the Mobile DRM systems [1]. The proposed standards for the DRM 
systems are called OMA-DRM [2], while the language, in which licenses are written, 
is called OMA-REL [3]. Like most such languages [4, 5, 6] OMA-REL is XML based 
and is defined as a mobile profile of ODRL [2]. OMA’s DRM is currently 
implemented in most mobile devices and smart phones and is adopted by most 
vendors for mobile content. We demonstrate that the OMA License Allocation 
Algorithm currently in use suffers from a loss of execution permissions (or rights) and 
we present a new algorithm to overcome this. We point out here that although this 
algorithm is designed to address problems of the OMA DRM system, the principals 
described in this paper (labeling licenses etc.) can be applied to other DRM domains 
as well, to counter the same problem and allow for an automated license selection 
with minimal loss of rights.   
Barth and Mitchel [7] characterize the loss of rights by introducing a notion of 
monotonicity in licenses. A license in their notation is said to be monotonic, if a 
sequence of actions allowed under one license is also allowed under a more flexible 
set of licenses. By more flexible, we mean a set of licenses that contains the same 
rights for the contents as the original license, possibly more rights for them with 
different constraints, and in addition contains rights about different contents. They 
  
show that all algorithms that assign actions to rights, as actions occur, are non–
monotonic in the context of OMA. They also prove that the problem of determining 
whether a sequence of actions complies with a license is an NP-complete problem. 
Monotonicity can be achieved by allowing the DRM agents to revise their past 
allocation of actions to rights after learning which other actions the consumers wish to 
perform.  
Here we present an algorithm that overcomes most cases of loss of rights without 
the need to design complex and computationally heavy algorithms for DRM agents 
that reallocate actions to rights, but instead only a labeling of the licenses is required. 
There exist some cases where our algorithm is not fully monotonic, but this is 
intentional. In the case were some form of loss is inevitable, we prompt the user on 
his preferences to what rights will be lost. This can cause the algorithm to behave 
non-monotonically, but we believe that in this special case an algorithm that respects 
the desires of the user is preferable to a fully monotonic algorithm.  
Our paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the algorithm and the loss of 
execution rights, section 3 gives a brief introduction to order sorted algebra and 
presents our new algorithm with some case studies. Section 4 introduces the reader to 
the concepts of Observation Transition Systems (OTS) and the algebraic specification 
language CafeOBJ. In addition in section 4 a specification of a DRM agent using this 
new algorithm is provided and the section concludes with a formal proof that our 
algorithm does not suffer from this loss of rights. Finally section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
2   The OMA Choice Algorithm  
In a DRM system users may end up with licenses from different sources that serve 
different purposes, for example advertisement licenses etc. It is possible for these 
licenses to refer to the same content.  So a problem rises as to what license should be 
considered optimal. OMA answers this by specifying a set of rules that the DRM 
agent must apply when automatically selecting which rights to apply when accessing 
content, in the case there are multiple rights for it this content [3]. These rules are in 
essence an ordering on the constraints defined by OMA REL which are transferred to 
the constraint sets of permissions. Although not explicitly stated these rules are 
inevitably projected to the licenses themselves, so for a fixed user request, applying 
these rules produces an ordering on the licenses themselves. We will refer to these 
rules as the OMA Allocation Algorithm. For example consider the following two 
licenses; 
License 1; you can listen to song A or D for one month after the first time you execute 
the play permission 
License 2; you can listen to songs A or C for one month starting October 2011 
In the above set of licenses we are posed with a question; what license should the 
DRM agent choose when requested to play song A?  Based on the rules imposed by 
OMA REL, the DRM agent must select the second license because it contains a date-
time constraint (for one month starting October 2011) which is ranked higher in the 
ordering than the interval constraint (one month after the first execution) of the first 
  
license. The intent behind this is that the interval will start whenever the user chooses 
while the date-time constraint will expire even if it is not exercised. So it is clear that 
this rule was created to benefit the user. Indeed when multiple constraints containing 
a date exist, the one that ends nearest to the present is to be preferred; the other rights 
can still be used later. In fact all of the rules set out in the specification are of similar 
intent; unconstraint rights are to be preferred over constraint and so on [3].  
So we can argue that the intent of this algorithm,  is to allow for an automated 
decision making process that will result in protecting the interests of the user by 
choosing to use, the license that maximizes the rights available to him after the 
execution of a right, although this is not explicitly stated in [3]. 
2.1   The OMA Allocation Algorithm 
The OMA allocation algorithm deals with the problem of multiple licenses that refer 
to the same content. A license is to be preferred if it contains a constraint of higher 
ranking in this order. It is described as follows [3]: 
 Only the rights that are valid at the given time should be taken into account 
from the algorithm. 
 Rights that are not constrained should always be preferred over constrained 
rights. 
 Any right that includes a date-time constraint, and possibly others, should be 
preferred over rights that are constrained but do not have such a restriction. 
 If there exists more than one rights with a date-time constraint, the one with 
the further in the future end element should be preferred. 
 If there exist a choice between many rights and none of them contains a 
date-time constraint the one containing an interval constraint should be 
preferred if there exists such. 
 Rights that contain a count constraint should be preferred after rights that 
contain a timed-count constraint. 
2.2   Losing Rights   
As we argued, this algorithm is designed to protect the interests of the user, by 
selecting licenses that allow for a maximum execution of rights under the installed set 
of licenses. Despite its intent there exist some special cases where using it may in fact 
lead to a more limited set of execution rights. This is caused mainly because this 
algorithm does not take into account the future requests of the user. A set of installed 
licenses    allows a finite power set of rights,       (  )  {        }, meaning that 
it is allowed for             (  )     and      . We denote by 
        (      ) the rights that still hold after the execution of a permission 
matching a request r from a license     . We define as a loss of rights the case 
where       (  )         (      )  { }. This denotes that more rights than the 
request are no longer available.  
For user request r, we desire an algorithm that selects a license l containing    
(matching the request r), such that for all other licenses l’ that also contain a right 
  
matching r to hold that         (       )           (      ). We will call this 
property minimal loss property.  
To understand how such a loss of rights can occur, assume a set of licenses and the 
original algorithm. For a user request r about content A, assume the algorithm selects 
license li. But this choice may affect the set of rights available for content B, depleting 
all rights referring to it. In the decision process of the original algorithm we do not 
take into account content B at all. We are only interested on what is the optimal right 
in regard to content A. This lack of generality is what causes this loss of rights. For a 
concrete example, let us consider the following two licenses installed in the device of 
a user. 
License1: “you may listen to songs A or B once before the end of the month” 
License2: “you may listen to songs A or D ten times.” 
These licenses translated in to OMA- REL contain the following constraints: License 
1 contains a date-time constraint (“before the end of the month”), while License 2 
contains a count constraint (“ten times”). If the user decides to use the right “listen to 
song A”, the OMA-DRM agent will select License 1 since it contains a date-time 
constraint that is ranked higher in the ordering. But by doing so, License 1 will 
become depleted since it also contains the count constraint denoted by “once”. This 
results in the user losing the right of ever listening to song B with this set of licenses. 
So,      (       )           (       ). This would not occur if the agent had 
selected License 2.  This clearly can be seen as against the best interest of the user, 
which as we argued is the intent of this algorithm and in [7] is characterized as an 
infuriating situation. Now consider a second example: 
License 1: “you can listen to songs A or B once”.  
License 2: “you can listen to songs A or C or D once”. 
Assume that there exists a user request to listen to song A.  In order to satisfy the 
request a loss of rights is inevitable, since all the licenses that contain the request 
cause a loss. How should an algorithm decide in this case? One option would be to 
simply allocate the request to the license that causes the minimal loss of rights. But it 
is possible that the user values the right to listen to song B higher than the right to 
listen to songs C or D combined. So we claim that in the case that a loss is inevitable 
the final decision should rest on the user. Instead of the minimal loss property we 
believe that an allocation algorithm should enjoy a weakened version of it: “when a 
loss of rights is not inevitable the minimal loss property holds”. We will refer to this 
property as the weak minimal loss property. 
3   Redesigning the Algorithm 
3.1 Order Sorted Algebra in a Nutshell 
An order sorted algebra is a partial ordering   on a set of sorts [11], where by sorts 
we usually mean a set of names for data types. This subsort relation imposes a 
restriction on an S-sorted algebra A, by s-sorted algebra we mean a mapping between 
  
the sort names and sub sets from the set A called the carriers of sort s,  that if      
then         where    denotes the elements of sort s in A. Order sorted algebra  
(OSA) [11] provides a way for several forms of polymorphism and overloading, error 
definition, detection and recovery, multiple inheritance, selectors when there are 
multiple constructors, retracts, partial operations made total on equationally defined 
sub-sorts, an operational semantics that executes equations as left-to-right rewrite 
rules and many more applications [11]. 
Formally, given a partially ordered sort set S, an S-sorted set A is just a family of 
sets   for each sort    . A many-sorted signature is a pair (S, Σ) where S is called 
the sort set and Σ is an     -sorted family of functions  {        
         }. 
An order sorted signature is a triple (     ) such that (S, Σ) is a many-sorted 
signature, (   ) is a poset, and the operations satisfy the following monotonicity 
condition;                 and        imply      . Given a many-sorted 
signature an (S, Σ)-algebra A is a family of sets {      } called the carriers of A, 
together with a function          for each σ in     , where               
w=s1..sn.  
 3.2   Licenses in OMA REL/DRM 
A license in OMA REL is a set of constructs we will call sublicenses. A sublicense is 
defined as a set of constraints, that when met, authorize a set of constraint 
permissions. A constraint permission now, is defined as a set of constraints that when 
met authorize in turn a set of permissions, or rights. Permission are defined as an 
action on a content that is protected by the DRM system. The actions defined by 
OMA REL are; play, display, print, execute and export. After allowing an action the 
DRM agent transforms the license by updating the constraints.  So licenses in OMA 
REL resemble in their structure a forest of trees where several sublicenses constitute a 
license. The structure of a sublicense can be seen in figure 1. The idea behind this 
structure is that a set of permissions is allowed if its “local” set of constraints is 
satisfied and the sublicenses constraints are met as well.  
Based on the ideas of order sorted algebra, we can argue that licenses are basically 
a data type. Consecutively there exist a sort set S, of sort names that can be used to 
represent these licenses. In addition, based on the rights object evaluation provided by 
the OMA Allocation Algorithm there exists a predefined ordering on these sorts. So if 
we identify the order sorted algebra that is “hidden” in the definition of licenses we 
can create an algorithm. The basic idea is to simply apply this ordering to decide what 
the most suitable license to use is.  
The key observation that leads to the redesign of the algorithm is that there exist 
some special cases that cause the loss of rights. Given a set of licenses, we can lose 
rights when: “A license contains more than one permission elements and after the 
execution some part of it becomes depleted”. According to this statement, we can 
argue that each license should be characterized by the following observations: 
A. Some part of the license becomes depleted after the execution of a right 
B. The license contains more than one permission elements  
C. The characterizing constraint based on the OMA constraint ordering 
  
 
 
Figure 1. A sublicense in OMA REL 
In order for A to occur, the license needs to contain either a count constraint (with one 
execution still allowed), or a timed count constraint (with once again one execution 
left). B can be easily checked at the level of the creation of a license. Finally, C can be 
achieved by a simple search on the license constraints. 
We can now define an  order sorted signature for OMA REL licenses as (      
      ) with        S3 = {Count, Timed-count, Date-time, Interval, True} the 
names of the various constraints allowed by OMA REL where we omit the 
constraints; individual, system, accumulated because they do not play any part in the 
decision made by the original algorithm. S1 = {Once, Many} denoting whether the 
license will allow more than one execution of its permissions. This can be easily 
checked, by first observing if the license contains a count or timed-count constraint. 
These constraints contain a positive integer stating the number of times the right can 
be executed and the DRM agent must reduce this number with each execution (in the 
case of timed-count the reduction occurs only after the passing of a specified time 
limit as well).  Finally S2 = {Complex, Simple}, denoting if the license contains more 
than one permissions.  
So essentially a license in this approach is an element of the carrier set As for each 
sort s where            . For example                 , denotes that 
the license allows only one more execution of a right, it contains only one right and 
the dominant constraint of the license is a count constraint. The ordering comes from 
the predefined ordering of the rights object evaluation algorithm in conjunction with 
the definintions:            and                 .  So, formally we have that 
                       implies that             (    
 
           
         (     
 
            
 
 ))  Using this ordering on licenses we will present in 
the next section a new algorithm for the decision problem of the optimal license. 
Our approach does not require any knowledge on behalf of the agent on the future 
actions of the users. It uses the existing OMA allocation algorithm in its core and its 
computational weight is moved to the creation of the licenses. Once this is done, the 
algorithm we propose is no more than a linear search on the licenses and an 
application of the initial OMA algorithm. We believe that our algorithm is relatively 
easy to implement since it does not require the reconstruction of all the DRM agents. 
  3.3   Labeling Licenses 
We could augment a license to contain those sort names by using labels that will be 
added to the sublicenses as a top label and to the constraint permission sets as a local 
label. This should be done simultaneously with the creation of the licenses to reduce 
Set of Permissions 
Set of Constraints 
Set of Constraints 
 
Set of Permissions 
Set of Constraints 
 
Constraint 
permission Set 
  
the computational cost on the mobile devices. We want each of these labels to denote 
when it comes to a constraint permission set or a sublicense:   
a) If it contains one or more permission elements/constraint permission sets; we 
define that the label will contain the designated word “Simple” or “Complex” 
respectively. 
b) The optimal constraint Name (based on the OMA ordering), we define that the 
label will contain the name of the Constraint, e.g. “Count”, “Datetime”, “True” 
(for unconstraint) and so on. 
c) Whether it becomes depleted after the next execution of one of its rights. Here we 
define that the label will contain the words “Once” or “Many” respectively. 
As an example, such a label for a constraint permission set could be         
          . In addition we assume that the DRM agent is enhanced so as to be 
able to update these labels after the execution of permissions as necessary. Meaning 
that if a license after the execution of permission allows only one more execution its 
label should be updated to say “Simple×Once×True” from “Simple×Many×True”. 
Formally a license enhanced with these labels is defined as a set of sublicenses. 
Each sublicense, sub-l, is a triplet                    where Cons is a set of 
constraints, CPerm is a set of constraint permission sets, and finally label is a label. 
We define operators to retrieve them as Constraints (sub-l), CPS (sub-l) and label 
(sub-l) respectively. Now each constraint permission set, CP, contains three elements 
as well, a set of constraints, a set of permissions and a label,                 . 
We define operators to retrieve these as: Constraints(CP), Perm(CP) and label(CP) 
respectively. For a CP now we define that,       (  )                       
            if  (    (  ) )    . This means that a set of constraint permissions is 
labeled as                                if and only if it contains only one 
permission.  Else it is labeled                            . Where       and 
           are variables with            and                . Now 
      (  )                                    if the execution of any one of 
the permissions in Perm(CP) causes the Constraints(CP) to no longer hold. This 
means that CP can only be used one more time.  Else it is labeled as         
                       . Where complexity is a variable,                . A 
sublicense now is labeled as,       (     )                             if 
  (    (     ))     . This means that the sub-license contains only one constraint 
permission set.  Else it is labeled                                Finally a 
sublicense is labeled as,       (     )                                   if 
the execution of a permission belonging to any of the constraint permission sets of the 
sub-license, CPS(sub-l),  causes Constraints(sub-l) to no longer hold.  Else 
     (     ) =                              . For example consider the 
sublicense: sub-l = {Once before the end of the month} either {up to ten times play 
songs A or B} or {once print document C}. Here we have that Constraint(sub-l) ={ 
one time,   before the end of the month}. CPS(sub-l) = {  CP1, CP2 } where CP1 = { 
(up to ten times) ( play songs A, play song B)} and CP2 = {(one time) (print 
document C)}. So here #(CPS(sub-l)) = 2.  
 
 
  
3.3   The proposed new Algorithm 
Now that we have defined the labels for the sublicenses/constraint permission sets we 
can present the proposed algorithm. Informally the intuition behind it is:  “check the 
licenses installed on the mobile DRM device for the ones matching the request of the 
user and see which do not fall into the special cases. If all fall into that category 
prompt the user. Else, if there exists a set of licenses that do not fall on this special 
category use the OMA Allocation Algorithm on them to obtain the optimal license. 
Finally update the labels if necessary”. 
 For label                               , we define      ( )         
    ( )             and     ( )            . For a constraint permission set 
CP and a request r, we define    (    )         if there exists a permission in CP 
that satisfies r. Similarly for a sublicense subl, we define    (      )         if 
there exists a           such that    (    )  For a license l    (   )         if 
there exists         such that    (      )  Finally for a set of licenses ls, 
   (    )         if there exists        such that    (   ).   An abstract version of 
the algorithm is shown in table 1.  
In the following sections we formally verify that this algorithm satisfies the 
weakened minimal loss property. This property guarantees that the algorithm will 
provide the user with the maximal possible set of available rights after the satisfaction 
of each request and at the same time respect his preferences of rights when a loss is 
inevitable. The cornerstone idea behind this algorithm is that a loss of rights will 
occur when the selected license contains the user request in a constraint permission 
set, CP,  of a sublicense, subl, such that either      (    )                
           or if      (    )                             then label(CP) 
=                        . The goal of the algorithm is to avoid such 
selections if that is possible. Else if only such licenses match the request, the user is 
prompted to ensure the satisfaction of his preference on the available rights.  
The first stage of the selection produces a set of licenses whose sublicenses that 
contain the request will either not get depleted after the actions execution or they 
contain only one set of constraint permissions. On the second stage the selection 
leaves us with a set of licenses that, on a constraint permission level, will either not 
get depleted after the execution or contain only one permission element, the 
permission matching the user request.   
 
Table 1. An abstract representation of the algorithm 
1. Input: a user request r, a set of licenses ls 
2. Store all licenses       for which     (    ) holds. If 
only one such license exists return that license.  
3. Else, store all licenses, l,  from step 2, for which it 
holds that    (      )              not (     (     (    ))  
            (     (    ))           )    
4. Search the licenses from step 3, and store all licenses 
l, such that    (    )                      for which not 
(     (     (  ))               (     (  ))           ).  
5. If the result of step 4 is not the empty set, then run 
  
 
Denoting as <label(subl),label( CP)> the pairs of labels for the sublicense and 
constraint permission set respectively, the algorithm only selects pairs of the 
following form; (i)<complexity × Many × constraint, Simple × times × constraint>, 
(ii) <complexity ×Many × constraint, complexity × Many X constraint>, (iii) 
<Simple × times × constraint, Simple × times × constraint>and (iv) <Simple × times 
× constraint, complexty × Many × constraint>.  So if the set from the second stage 
exists, it will contain the licenses matching the request that become depleted if and 
only if they only contain a single permission matching request and nothing else. 
Using the above algorithm there exist only two ways for a permission to get lost. The 
first case is when all the licenses for which    (   ) cause a loss. In this case the user 
is prompted by the algorithm as to which rights he prefers to loose. So in this case it is 
clear that the algorithm protects the preferences of the users and we consider this loss 
as intentional. The second case occurs when there exists only one license l such that 
   (   ) and l causes a loss of rights. But as we must always try to satisfy the request 
if there exists a suitable license, this loss is considered intentional as well.  
3.4   Case Studies 
We have implemented the above algorithm in Java and were able to do several case 
studies so as to check that no loss of rights occurs. In Table 2 we can see some of the 
license sets checked. As we can see in the Table 2 the two algorithms agree on 
licenses where the special cases do not occur while the proposed algorithm correctly 
chooses the license that will not cause any loss of permissions in the case of these 
special circumstances. 
 
Table 2. Case Studies implemented in Java 
License Set User  
request 
Proposed  
Algorithm 
OMA Choice  
Algorithm 
License 1: “play songs A or B once 
before the end of the month” 
License 2: “play songs A or C ten 
times” 
Play song A License 2 License 1 
License 1: “for a total of ten times, 
display content 1 or until the end of 
the month play content2” 
License 2: “until the end of the 
month play content 2 three times or 
display content 1”.   
Display content 1 License 2 License 2 
the original OMA allocation algorithm on only those 
licenses and return the result.  
6. Else prompt the user to select a license from step 2.  
  
License 1: “for a total of ten times, 
display content 1 or until the end of 
the month play content2” 
License 2: “until the end of the 
month play content 2 three times or 
display content 1”.   
Play content 2 License 2 License 2 
License 1: “for a total of ten times, 
display content 1 or play content2” 
License 2: “play content 2 three 
times or display content 1”.   
License 3: “play content 2 or 3 
once before the end of the month” 
 
Play content 2 License 1 License 3 
We believe that the algorithm proposed here better captures the intent of the OMA 
specification. The originals algorithms intent is to allow for automated selection, 
while allowing for the maximum possible permissions being available to the user. 
Tthe original algorithm fails in doing so for some special cases, on the other hand our 
algorithm is designed to overcome these losses of rights, without altering the original 
algorithm significantly.   
4. Verification of the proposed algorithm 
Case studying can never replace a formal proof no matter how thorough. In this 
section we present a formal proof that the proposed algorithm satisfies the weakened 
minimal loss property. The proof was conducted by specifying an arbitrary OMA 
DRM system that uses this algorithm, as an Observation Transition System (OTS) 
[12].  Next we defined this OTS in CafeOBJ notation [13], an algebraic specification 
langue that allows computer human interactive theorem proving. 
We wish to prove that the weakened minimal loss property holds. We assume a set 
of licenses   , installed in a DRM agent such that for each request r, if there exist a set 
of licenses ls’ for which           (   ) the algorithm always selects      , else 
nothing is selected. There exist three cases. 
a) Only one license exists such that    (   ).  For the property to hold the algorithm 
in this case must select l. 
b) All the licenses for which    (   ) cause a loss of rights. Here the property holds 
trivially. This is the case where the algorithm prompts the user.  
c) There exists       such that    (   ) and l does not cause a loss of rights. In 
order for an algorithm to satisfy the weakened minimal loss property here one of 
the following must hold: 
1. If there exists l such that    (   ) and no part of l gets depleted then l must 
be selected 
2. If c1) does not hold then, there exists a license l’, such that    (  )  
       (       )  { }. For the property to hold     must be selected. 
  
Indeed in case c1) we have that         (      )        (  ), so for all other 
      such that    (    ) we will have        (       )         (  ), so the 
property will hold.  Likewise in c2) we have that       (  )        (       )  
{ }. So if there exists l such that    (   ) and         (  )        (      )  { } 
then for all other l’ that     (    ) it will hold that        (       )     
       (      ).  
It is trivial to prove that our algorithm selects l such that    (   ) since it is 
explicitly stated in step two that the selection takes place from only these licenses. 
Point c1) is also trivial since when there exists a license that will not get depleted then 
both the sublicense, sub-l, and the constraint permission set, CP, for which    (    
   ) and    (    ) holds we have that      (     )       and      (  )  
    . The algorithm explicitly states in step three and four that it selects such 
licenses.   
What remains to be verified for the proposed algorithm is the disjunction of bullets 
(a), (b) and (c2). We will call this disjunction Property 3.  
4.1   Connection between weakened minimal loss property and liveness property 
In order to verify Property 3 we will transform it to the liveness property of figure 
2 and verify that instead. We assume a set of licenses    and that for a requests r the 
algorithm selects        such that     (   ), as discussed there is no need to verify 
this. Next we define a coloring on the permissions of       (  ). Initially all the 
permissions are colored white. If no part of l is depleted after the execution of the 
permission corresponding to r, then the coloring of the permissions remains 
unchanged. If some part of   gets depleted, causing the rights       (  ) 
        (      ) to become unavailable, we define that the color of   
{      (  )         (      )} becomes black, if l is the only license such that 
   (   ) or if all the other licenses    for which    (    ) holds also cause a loss of 
rights or if p matches the user request r. In all other cases the color of p remains 
unchanged.  
Proposition. Assume that for all permissions         (  ), the user makes a 
request r that matches p an infinite number of times (fairness), and that no license gets 
depleted by any other means except the selection and use of some permission. Finally, 
since when there exists l such that    (   ) and no part of l gets depleted, it is 
straightforward to prove that l is selected by our algorithm; we can assume that there 
are no such licenses in ls. Formally the latter is expressed as; for all licenses       , 
all sublicenses       , and all constraint permission sets        (  ), 
if     (     (  ))       , then      (     (  ))       . Under these three 
assumptions we claim that                    . 
 
Property 4 
if a permission right belongs to the installed licenses of the DRM system and is colored White 
that leads-to it being colored Black 
Figure 2. Liveness property that corresponds to the weakened minimal loss property  
 
  
Proof. Due to the third assumption when selected all licenses from ls have some 
part of them depleted. So after each request       (  )         (      )   .  For 
the liveness property to hold it suffices to prove that after the satisfaction of a request 
all the unavailable permissions will get colored black. Indeed the coloring of    
      ( )  is defined to only change when          (  )         (      ). Since 
Property 4 claims that all the permissions get colored black if they belong to 
      (  ) and originally all permissions are colored white, the change can only 
occur when          (  )         (      ). So for the liveness property to hold, 
after each selection all the rights of       (  )         (      ) must get colored 
black.  But that will only happen if there exists only one license such that    (   ) or 
when all other licenses      for which     (    ) cause a loss of rights as well or 
when       (  )         (      )  { }, i.e. when Property 3 holds. So the 
liveness property holds only when Property 3 holds, i.e., Property 4 implies Property 
3.  This is the property we will verify for the OTS in CafeOBJ specification of the 
algorithm.  
4.2   Observation Transition Systems, Behavioral Objects and CafeOBJ 
An Observation Transition System (OTS) is a transition system that can be written in 
terms of equations.  Assuming a universal state space, say Y, an OTS S is a triplet S = 
<O, I, T> where I is a subset of Y, the set of initial states of the system and O is a set 
of observation operators. Each observer in O is a function that takes a state of the 
system and possibly a series of other data type values (visible sorts) and returns a 
value of a data type that is characteristic to that state of the system. Given an OTS   
and two states        , the equivalence (       ) between them wrt   is 
defined as       (  )   (  ). The previous equality creates the equivalence 
classes,        on the states of an OTS. Finally, T is the set of transition, conditional 
functions (or actions). Each transition takes as input a state of the system and again 
possibly a series of data-type values and returns a new state of the system. If     
      (  )   (  ) for each           . For each      ( ) is called the 
successor state of u wrt τ. The condition    of   is called the effective condition. Also, 
for each      ( )    if    ( ).  
An OTS defines a Behavioral Object, Behavioral Object Composition 
methodology has been defined formally in [14, 15]. From the state of the composite 
object we can retrieve the state of the component objects via Projection Operators 
[14, 15]. There are several ways to compose an object from component objects. 
Parallel Composition without Synchronization, if the changes on the states of an 
object do not affect the states of the other objects of the same level. Parallel 
Composition with Synchronization when the changes in the state of one object may 
alter the state of an object in the same level. In respect to the number of objects that 
compose a composite object, we have Dynamic Composition if that number of 
component objects is not fixed. Else the composition is called Static. 
 CafeOBJ is an algebraic specification language [13]. The choice was made 
because an OTS can be written in CafeOBJ in a natural way. Moreover, hierarchical 
behavioral object composition, has already been defined in [14, 15] with the use of 
  
CafeOBJ. The universal state space   is denoted in CafeOBJ by a hidden sort, while 
each observer by an observation operator. Assuming visible sorts     and   that 
correspond to the data types    and  , where          , the observation operator 
denoting         is declared as follows;                  . Any state in   is 
denoted by a constant, say init, which is declared as:           . A transition 
          is denoted by a CafeOBJ action operator:                  , with 
   a visible sort corresponding to the data type    and          . Each transition is 
defined by defining the value returned by each observer in the successor state, when 
        is applied in a state  . When          ( ) holds, this is expressed generally 
by a conditional equation denoted by the keyword ceq.  The value returned by         
is not changed if         is applied in a state u such that  (         ( )).  The basic 
building blocks of a CafeOBJ specification are modules. Each module defines a sort. 
CafeOBJ provides built in modules for the most commonly used data-types (visible 
sorts) like BOOL (that specifies propositional logic), and so on.  An underscore _ in 
the definition of an operator indicates the place where an argument is put. For 
example the definition of the negation operator could be op not_: Bool -> 
Bool. The pervious states that not is an operator (denoted by the keyword op) that 
after the string not takes as input a visible value of the sort Bool and returns a value 
of the visible sort Bool again. The keyword mod! (mod*) indicates that the module 
being defined has tight (loose) semantics. Visible (hidden) sorts are denoted enclosing 
them within [and] (*[and]*). The keyword eq is used to denote an equation and 
as already mentioned ceq to denote a conditional equation. Modules can be imported 
using the keyword pr. Finally the key word bop is used to denote observation and 
action operators (with bops being used to denote more than one simultaneously). 
4.3   Proving Liveness properties in CafeOBJ 
The OTS/CafeOBJ method has been successfully applied to the verification of 
systems safety properties, by many researchers and the industry including our group 
[8-10]. The property we must prove here is a liveness property, which is different than 
safety properties. It is a temporal property of the form: something good will eventually 
happen. The procedure to prove such properties is briefly explained below and the 
reader is invited to consult [16] for a full review of the subject.  In addition we refer 
the readers interested in the verification of safety properties to [12-13].  Finally we 
should point out here that this is one of the first attempts to apply this technique to 
verify a real algorithm and this holds in, our opinion, some merit of its own, as it also 
displays the power of this technique.  
4.3.1 Liveness Properties  
Predicates whose type is Y: → Bool are called state predicates. Every state 
predicate in this paper does not have any quantifiers unless explicitly stated. Also we 
must point out that free variables in formulas in this setting are assumed to be 
universally quantified.  As described in more detail in [16] there exist five kind of 
  
basic properties in the OTS/CafeOBJ framework, inspired by UNITY [17]. We 
assume that p, q, r, pj, are arbitrary state predicates, J an arbitrary set and u, u’ two 
reachable states of the system. Given an OTS S the five basic properties are defined, 
          ,         ,             ,              and              (        ). 
Informally p unless s q states that whenever predicate p holds in a state and q does 
not hold then after applying a transition rule we get to a state that either p will hold or 
q.  Stable s p states that once we reach a state that p holds p keeps holding, although 
reaching such a state is not guaranteed. Invariant s q says that q holds in all reachable 
states of the OTS S. Next p ensures s q states that if S reaches a state where p holds, S 
will eventually reach a state where q holds. Finally p leads-tos q is similar to ensure 
but here p is not guaranteed to hold until q becomes true. Also leads-to properties are 
transitive from definition while ensures are not.  In [16] a more thorough analysis of 
the above informal is presented.   
4.3.2 Verification with CafeOBJ  
The literature on the verification of safety (invariant) properties using the 
OTS/CafeOBJ Proof Score method is quite extensive [13,8,9,10,18,19] and many 
more. Readers are invited to refer to the above literature as the verification of liveness 
properties usually requires the verification of lemmas, which most likely will be 
invariant (safety) properties. Here we will describe briefly how to verify that S 
satisfies ensures and leads-to properties. This together with the verification of 
invariant properties covers all of the five basic properties we described above because 
proving ensures properties consists of proving unless properties and finally stable 
properties are special cases of unless properties. Suppose that the OTS S is specified 
in a module say SYS, which defines a hidden sort H. Also we assume that the 
invariant properties wrt S are declared in a module say INV. 
Proving a property of the form p ensuress q, is equivalent with the proof of 
                            . The first predicate is called the “unless” case while 
the second the “eventually” case.   
In order to prove the “unless” case we must show that for all transition rules the 
unless inductive step is preserved. For an arbitrary state s and an arbitrary successor 
state s’ this step informally states that if p holds in s and q does not hold in s implies 
that in s’ either p or q will hold. In CafeOBJ notation this will look something like: 
eq ustep(za) = (unlp(s, za) and not (unlq(s, za))) implies 
(unlp(s’, za) or unlq(s’, za)) . 
Where unlp and unlq are CafeOBJ formulas representing predicates p and q 
respectively.  If these are defined in a module say UNL and for a transition rule t we 
prove that t preserves the unless step with a proof score like the following:  
 
open USTEP 
-- Declaration of constants 
op y1: -> V1 . 
... 
op yn : -> Vn . 
  
Declaration of equations denoting casei 
-- declaration of the successor state 
eq s’= t(s, y1, ..., yn) . 
-- check if the predicate holds 
red Lemmas implies ustep(z1, …, za) . 
close 
Above yi are constants denoting arbitrary values of the data types. Also red is a 
CafeOBJ command used for the reduction of the given term based on the equations 
defined in the open module. Finally Lemmas is a CafeOBJ term constructed by the 
conjunction of some predicates used as lemmas, to discard cases that return false. 
Notice here that since the variables zi occur freely in p and q they are equivalent to 
being universally quantified.  If CafeOBJ returns true in all sub-cases and all 
transition rules, the proof of the “unless case” is successfully completed.   
For the “eventually case” the inductive step informally states that if in s p holds 
and q does not hold then q will hold in a successor state s’. Here we must prove that 
there exists a witness of a transition that makes the eventual step true. If that rule is t 
then it can be checked with a proof like the previous by replacing the unless step with 
a term say estep(z1, …, za) that defines the eventually step in CafeOBJ 
notation and opening the module where this is defined.  
Rewriting is used to verify that an OTS satisfies leads-to properties, based on a set 
of deduction rules defined in [16]. A technicality is that we cannot use the logical 
operators that are defined in the built-in CafeOBJ module Bool, this is analyzed in 
[16]. So we need to re-define them and define an operator to evaluate them. This is 
done in a new module, usually called OTSLOGIC. For example the evaluation of and 
can be defined as: eq eval (P/\Q) = eval(P) and eval(Q) .Where P 
and Q are CafeOBJ variables.  Next, since reasoning for leads-to properties requires 
invariant, ensures and lead-to properties, we must also define the appropriate 
operators in OTSLOGIC, invariant, ensures and |--> respectively. 
Finally we must define the equations that correspond to the conditional deductive 
rules as they are defined in [16]. In [16] three kind of such parameterized rules are 
defined. The parameters can be instantiated with the operators invariant, 
ensures and |-->. This gives a total of 21 conditional rules that defined in 
OTSLOGIC that we can use to reason about leads-to properties.  
4.4   Specification of the proposed algorithm as an OTS in CafeOBJ 
4.4.1   Basic Data Types 
Before introducing the OTSs that specify a DRM agent that implements the proposed 
algorithm, we need first specify the data types that are required. These specifications 
consist of modules that define visible sorts, each of whom corresponds to a data type.  
In order to specify the OTSs the following data types where required: 
1. Content, defines the visible sort cont, and specifies the abstract concept of a 
digital content. 
2. Permission, defines the visible sorts action, perm.  It imports the module  
  
mod* Label{ [type1 , type2 ,type3 < label] 
op _=_ : label label -> Bool {comm} 
op _=_ : type1 type1 -> Bool {comm} 
op _=_ : type2 type2 -> Bool {comm} 
op _=_ : type3 type3 -> Bool {comm} 
ops simple complex  : -> type1 
ops count datetime true : -> type2 
ops once many : -> type3 
op _ & _ & _ : type1 type2 type3 -> label 
op type1?_ : label -> type1 
op type2?_ : label -> type2 
op type3?_ : label -> type3 
var t1 : type1 
var t2 : type2 
var t3 : type3  
eq type1?(t1 &  t2 & t3) = t1 . 
eq type2?(t1 & t2 &  t3) = t2 . 
eq type3?(t1 & t2 &  t3) = t3 . 
eq (t1 = t1 ) = true . 
eq (t2 = t2 ) = true . 
eq (t3 = t3 ) = true . } 
Figure 3. The module defining a Label in CafeOBJ notation 
 
Content and specifies what actions are allowed on contents as defined by the 
OMA specification (play, display, print, export, execute). These are 
specified as constants of the action sort. In addition it defines the concept of a 
permission as a binary operator on the sorts of action and cont.  
3. Request, defines the visible sorts of req and reqErr that specify a user 
request and an invalid user request respectively. It imports the modules 
Permission and Content. A request is specified as a pair of content and an 
action.  
4. Colors, defines the visible sort color and the constants black and white of that 
sort. 
5. Label, defines the visible sorts of type1, type2, type3 and label.  As 
type1 the constants simple, complex are defined. Next as type2 the 
constants count, datetime, true are defined.  Finally as type3 we 
define the constants once, many. A label is defined by the operator _&_&_ 
that takes as input an element of type1×type2×type3. Also three operators 
that take as input a label and return the corresponding type are defined; type1?, 
type2?, type3? . The CafeOBJ code for this module is given in figure3. 
6. SET, is a parameterized module that defines the visible sorts of Elt and Set. 
These correspond to an abstract arbitrary data type that will act as elements for a 
set and a set of such elements respectively. The module is parameterized meaning 
that it can be instantiated with another module, which will instantiate the 
elements, so as to specify the set of a specific type of elements.   
7. Constraint, ConstraintSet are two modules specifying the constraints 
defined by OMA and a set of such constraints respectfully. 
8. ConstraintPermission, SetofCP, are two modules specifying a  
  
Observers Signature Description 
validsublic : Lsys subLic -> 
Bool 
Returns true if the constraints of the 
sublicense are met at the given state 
bop validCP : Lsys cPerm -> 
Bool 
 
Returns true if the constraints of the constraint 
permission set are met at the given state 
bop installed : Lsys -> licSet Returns the set of installed licenses 
Table 3. Observers of the component OTS 
constraint permission set as a set of constraints when met allows a set of 
permissions and a set of such elements respectfully.  
Sublicense, defines the visible sort subLic that specifies the concept of a 
sublicense. A set of constraints that when it is met allows a set of constraint 
permission sets.  
9. License, defines the visible sort lic that instantiates the module SET by 
defining a set with sub-licenses as elements. This corresponds to the definition of 
a license in OMA REL; a set of sub-licenses. 
10. LicSet, defines the visible sort licSet, that by instantiating the module SET 
again defines a set of licenses. 
4.4.2   OTS Model and its Specification in CafeOBJ 
Next we define the hidden sorts for our OTS. Each such sort defines the state space of 
an abstract machine. In our specification we require two such sorts. The first sort, 
Lsys, specifies a system that consists of a set of licenses that can deplete a whole 
sublicense or a constraint permission set after a relative request. This sort is defined in 
module LOTS that imports the module LicSet. The observation operators it contains 
are presented in table 3.  
In this OTS all the installed licenses have their constraints met at the initial state of 
the system. This is defined by the equation:  ceq validsublic(initl, SL1) 
= true if (SL1 /inL installed(initl)). Where SL1 is a CafeOBJ 
variable denoting an arbitrary sub-license, /inL is an operator that checks if a sub-
license is contained in a set of licenses and initl is a hidden sort constant denoting 
an arbitrary initial state of the OTS.   
The transitions of the OTS can be seen in table 4. Assuming that S, CP1 are 
variables defining an arbitrary state and an arbitrary constraint permission 
respectively while SL1, SL2 are variables defining arbitrary sub-licenses, the 
equations defining the first transition can be seen in table 5.  
 
 Transition Signatures Description 
bop depleteSL : Lsys subLic -> 
Lsys 
 
Models the transition that occurs when the 
whole of the given license becomes depleted 
bop depleteCP : Lsys cPerm  -> 
Lsys Models the transition that occurs when a 
constraint permission set of a sublicense 
becomes depleted.  
Table 4. Transitions of the first OTS 
  
eq installed(depleteSL(S , SL1)) = installed(S) . 
ceq validsublic(depleteSL(S , SL1) , SL2) = validsublic(S , SL2) 
if not (SL1 = SL2) . 
ceq validsublic(depleteSL(S , SL1) , SL2) = false  if  (SL1 = 
SL2) . 
ceq validCP(depleteSL(S , SL1) , CP1) = validCP(S , CP1) if not 
( CP1 /inCP3 SL1) . 
ceq validCP(depleteSL(S , SL1) , CP1) = false if  ( CP1 /inCP3 
SL1) .  
Table 5. Equations defining the depleteSL transition.  
Our goal is to specify a DRM agent that uses the new algorithm. So this OTS does 
not suffice. We will use this OTS as a component object of our new OTS that 
specifies our system. This OTS defines a new state space denoted by the hidden sort 
sys. In order to derive the state of the component object from the composite object 
we use projection operators. These are special kind of operators that given a state of 
the composite system return a state of one of the components. Since in this 
specification we only have one component we only define one projection: bop 
license_ : sys -> Lsys. For example assuming that init is a CafeOBJ 
constant that denotes the initial sate of the composite OTS, we derive the state of the 
component system with the following equation, stating that the component object will 
be at its initial state as well: eq license(init) = initl . 
In order to specify the behavior of a system that implements the proposed 
algorithm for an arbitrary set of installed licenses the observers of table 6 where 
required. To conclude the definition of our OTS we must define the transitions that 
will take place, the conditions under which these rules change the state of the system 
successfully, and finally what each observer observes in a state that is derived from an 
arbitrary state after applying these rules. The transitions used are shown in table 7. 
Where in the description with subl we denote a sublicense such that for user request r 
   (      ) holds and with cp we denote a constraint permission such that      
     and    (    ). Also in table 7 we refer to the following property as Prop5: cp is 
the only constraint permission such that    (    ) or for all other             such 
   (     ) holds then (     (     )              (     )            )  
(     (   )              (   )           ).   
Table 6. Observers of the composite OTS 
Observer Signature Description 
bop licIns : sys -> licSet Returns the set of installed licenses. 
bop useReq : sys -> reqErr 
 
Returns the request of the user at the given 
state, if it exists. Else returns an error constant 
bop best : sys  -> lic 
 
Returns the license the algorithm selects for 
the user request  
bop color : sys perm ->  color 
 
Returns the color of the given permission 
bop possLic : sys -> licSet 
 
Returns a set of licenses that contain the user 
request in a constraint permission set that is 
  
not labeled as Once or is labeled as Simple.  
bop finalLic :  sys -> licSet 
 
Returns a set of licenses that belong to 
possLic and the labels of the sublicenses 
where the request belongs are not labeled as 
Once or are labeled as Simple.  
bop allowed : sys -> permSet   
 
Returns the set of permissions allowed by the 
installed licenses initially.  
As an example of the specification process with the OTS/CafeOBJ system we will 
analyze the code specifying the use3 transition in table 8. The numbers in the 
beginning of each line are not part of the code and are used as reference.  In equations 
1 to 2 we define the effective condition for the transition rule. Find4 is an operator 
that takes as input a request and a license and returns the sub-license the request 
belongs to. label? is another operator that takes as input a sub-license and returns its 
label. The next operator #_ takes as input a set and returns the number of elements in 
it. Equation 3 defines a mapping from the state of the system to the state of the 
component OTS through the projection operator.  This equation states that new state 
of the component OTS will be attained from the old by depleting the sublicense 
containing to the user request. This is achieved by reference to the transition of the 
component object depleteSL. Lines 4 to 5 state, that the set of installed licenses 
remains unchanged by this transition, and that we no longer have a pending user 
request. 
 
Transition Signatures Description 
bop request : reqErr sys -> sys 
Denotes that a user makes a request  
bop choose  : sys -> sys 
 
Models the transition where the DRM agent 
selects a license for the user request 
bop use1    : sys -> sys Models the transition where the algorithm 
selects and uses a license in which 
     (  )        ,     (    )       
and prop5 holds.   
bop use3    : sys -> sys 
 
Models the transition where the algorithm 
selects and uses a license in which 
     (    )         and prop5 holds.  
bop use4    : sys -> sys 
 
Models the transition where the algorithm 
selects and uses a license for which 
     (  )        ,      (    )        
and prop5 does not hold.  
bop use5    : sys -> sys Models the transition where the algorithm 
selects and uses a license in which 
     (    )         and prop5 does not 
hold. 
Table 7. Transitions of the composite OTS 
  
1. op c-use3 : sys -> Bool 
2. eq c-use3(S) =(not(useReq(S) = null) and (not (best(S) = 
emptyLic))) and (type3?(label? (find4(useReq(S), best(S)))) = 
once) and ((# build2(useReq(S) , licIns(S) ,license(S))== 1) 
or ( (possLic(S) = emptyLic) or  (finalLic(S)= emptyLic)))  . 
3. ceq license(use3(S))=depleteSL(license(S),find4 (useReq (S), 
best(S))) if c-use3(S) . 
4. ceq   licIns(use3(S)) = licIns(S) if c-use3(S) . 
5. ceq   useReq(use3(S)) = null if  c-use3(S) .  
6. ceq   color(use3(S) , P) = black if (P = perm3?(useReq(S) 
,find3(useReq(S),best(S)))) and (P /in allowed(use3(S)))  and 
c-use3(S) . 
7. ceq color(use3(S),P)= black if (belong3?(makeReq(P) , 
skolem(P)) and (skolem(P) /inCP2 best(S)) and (P /in 
allowed(use3(S))) and c-use3(S)) . 
8. ceq color(use3(S),P)=color(S,P) if belong3?( makeReq(P), 
skolem(P))and not (skolem(P)/inCP2 best(S))and(P/in allowed 
(use3(S))) and c-use3(S)  . 
9. ceq color(use3(S),P)= color(S,P) if not(P = perm3?(useReq(S) 
, find3(useReq(S),best(S)))) and ( not(belong3?(makeReq(P) , 
skolem(P)) and (skolem(P) /inCP2 best(S)))) and (P /in 
allowed(use3(S))) and c-use3(S)  . 
10. ceq finalLic(use3(S))= finalLic(S) if c-choose(S) . 
11. ceq best(use3(S)) =  emptyLic if c-use3(S) . 
12. ceq allowed(use3(S)) = allowed(S) if c-use3(S) . 
13. ceq use3(S) = S if not c-use3(S) .  
Table 8. Definition of the use3 transition in CafeOBJ notation 
Equations 6 to 9 define the coloring of arbitrary permission elements. The first 
equation states that a permission element is colored black if it equals the user request 
and belongs to the license the algorithm selected. The operator perm3? takes as input 
a user request and a constraint permission and returns the permission that matches the 
request. Also find3 is an operator similar to find4 only that it returns the 
constraint permission set containing the request. Equation 7 uses Skolemization (via 
the operator skolem_) to denote that a permission p gets colored black if there exist a  
constraint permission set cp, in the sub-license of the selected license that contains the 
user request that becomes depleted such that      . Skolemization is required 
because there is no other way to denote existential operators in CafeOBJ. The 
operator belong3?, returns true if a permission belongs to a constraint permission 
set. 
 
Liveness Property in CafeOBJ Notation Liveness Property in Natural Language 
op lto : sys perm  -> Bool 
eq lto(S, P) = ((color(S , P) = 
white) /\ (P /in allowed(S)))  |-->  
(color(S, P) = black ) . 
if a permission  right belongs to the 
installed licenses of the DRM system 
and is Colored White that leads to it 
being Colored Black 
Table 9. Liveness Property to Prove 
  
The operator _/inCP2_ checks if a constraint permission set belongs to a license.  
Equation 8 states that the color of a permission should remain unchanged, if it belongs 
to a constraint permission set that does not belong to the sublicense of the selected 
license that contains the request. Finally equation 9 states that the color should again 
remain unchanged if a permission is does not match the request and does not belong 
to a constraint permission set in the license that the algorithm has chosen. Equations 
10 to 13 define that the elements of the finalLic array should remain unchanged, that 
the request is fulfilled so there is no longer a license selected, that the permissions 
originally allowed by the licenses remain unchanged and that finally the state of the 
OTS does not change if effective condition is not met.   
4.5   Verification of the algorithm 
The first step of the verification is to define the property we wish to prove in a module 
that imports OTSLOGIC, usually called LTO. The desired property can be seen in 
table 9, where S is a CafeOBJ variable denoting a state of the system and P variable 
denoting an arbitrary permission.  
The next step is to ask CafeOBJ to reduce if the property holds in a script (called 
proof score). If CafeOBJ returns true, means that the property is proved. This is 
achieved using the red command that reduces a term based on the specification and 
by replacing the variables with arbitrary constants: 
open LTO 
red  lto(s,p) . 
close . 
In most cases, CafeOBJ will return an expression different than true or false. This 
means that it cannot continue with the rewriting and we must feed it with additional 
equations or lemmas to help it.  
In the case of verifying liveness properties it is helpful to look at the deduction 
rules defined in OTSLOGIC and see if it is possible to break down the property in to 
leads-to, ensures and invariant properties. The desired property here was proved 
using two ensure properties ens1, ens2 and CafeOBJ returned true for the following 
proof passage: 
open LTO 
red (ens1(s , p ) /\ ens2(s , p )) =>  lto(s , p) . 
close . 
The two ensure properties can be seen in table 10. So now in order to complete our 
verification we must prove these two properties. 
 
 
 
  
The first ensures property 
eq ens1(S , P) =  (((makeReq(P) = useReq(S)) \/  
(belong3?(makeReq(P) , find3(useReq(S) , best(S))) /\   
(type3?(labelCP?(find3(useReq(S), best(S) ))) = once)                           
/\(not(type3?(label?(find4(useReq(S),best(S)))) = once))   /\  ( 
(# build2(useReq(S) , licIns(S),license(S)) == 1)  
\/(possLic(S)= emptyLic)\/ (finalLic(S)= emptyLic)))    
\/(belong3?(makeReq(P),skolem(P)) /\ (skolem(P) /inCP2 best(S)  
/\ ~(best(S) = emptyLic))/\(type3?(label?(find4(useReq(S) , 
best(S)))) = once) /\ ((# build2(useReq(S) , licIns(S), 
license(S))== 1)  \/ ( possLic(S) = emptyLic) \/ (finalLic(S) = 
emptyLic))))/\(P /in allowed(S))) ensures (color(S , P ) = black 
).  
The second ensures property 
eq ens2(S ,P ) = (((color(S , P) = white) /\ (P /in allowed(S))) 
)   ensures  (((makeReq(P) = useReq(S)) \/  ( 
belong3?(makeReq(P) , find3(useReq(S) , best(S)))  /\ 
(type3?(labelCP?(find3(useReq(S), best(S) ))) = once)  /\  
(not(type3?(label?(find4(useReq(S) , best(S)))) = once))  /\  ( 
(# build2(useReq(S) , licIns(S),license(S)) == 1)  \/  
(possLic(S) = emptyLic)   \/  (finalLic(S)= emptyLic)                            
) ) \/   (   belong3?(makeReq(P) , skolem(P)) /\ (skolem(P) 
/inCP2 best(S)  /\ ~(best(S) = emptyLic) )  /\ 
(type3?(label?(find4(useReq(S) , best(S)))) = once)  /\                        
(# build2(useReq(S) , licIns(S), license(S))== 1)  \/( 
possLic(S) = emptyLic)\/  (finalLic(S) = emptyLic)  ))) /\ (P 
/in allowed(S)) )   . 
Table 10. The first two lemmas required for the verification 
 
For each ensures property we first must prove the unless case and the eventually 
case.  Here we will only present the verification of the unless case of the first ensures 
property for one transition rule. In total 7 lemmas where required to complete the 
verification of these cases and they are provided in table 11. Three of them are 
lemmas on the states of the OTS while the rest are lemmas on the data-types. 
We will present here the subcase for the verification of the use4 transition. We 
ask CafeOBJ to check this using the following proof score: 
CafeOBJ notation Natural Language Notation 
eq inv2(S,P)= 
((not(P=perm3?(useReq(S), 
find3(useReq(S),best(S))))) and 
not(useReq(S)= null) and not(P = 
err) )                 implies not 
( makeReq(P) = useReq(S)) .   
If a permission element is not the equal 
to the outcome of finding the 
permission of license chosen by the 
algorithm as the best to use and it is not 
an error (null) and there is a valid user 
request pending then that permission 
does not equal the user request. 
  
eq inv3(S , P) =  (P /in 
allowed(init)) implies (P /in 
allowed(S)) . 
If a permission element belongs to the 
set of initially allowed permission by 
the installed licenses then it keeps 
belonging to that set in all stages. 
eq inv4(S , P) =  ((P = 
perm3?(useReq(S),find3(useReq(S) , 
best(S)))) and not(useReq(S)= null) 
and not(P = err) )                     
implies  (makeReq(P)= userReq(S)).    
If a permission element is equal to the 
outcome of finding the permission of 
license chosen by the algorithm as the 
best to use and it is not an error (null) 
and there is a valid user request 
pending then that permission is equal 
the user request. 
eq inv5(R ,CP , P)  = ((P = 
perm3?(R ,CP) ) and not(R= null ))  
implies ( R = makeReq(P)) . 
If a permission element is equal to the 
out-come of matching a request in a 
constraint permission and it is not null 
then the permission element equals the 
request. 
eq inv6(R,PS,P)  = ((P = perm2?(R 
,PS) ) and not(R = null ) and not 
(perm2?(R ,PS) = err)  )  implies ( 
R = makeReq(P) ) . 
If a permission element is the match 
for a request in a permission set and it 
is valid and the request is valid that 
implies that the request matches the 
permission element 
eq inv7(R , P) = not(belong1?(R ,P) 
and not(makeReq(P) = R )). 
 if a request does not equal to a 
permission element then transforming 
that permission into a request does not 
match it. 
Figure 7. Lemmas required for the verification 
 
open USTEP 
op p : -> perm  . 
op cp : -> cPerm  . 
op r : -> req . 
eq s' = use4(s). 
red ustep1(s , p ) . 
close 
CafeOBJ returns neither true nor false here. Instead it returns an expression from 
which we can conclude that the machine cannot deduce whether the effective 
condition for this rule holds. So we result to case-splitting to assist the machine with 
the rewriting, the first case that denotes that the effective condition does not hold is 
defined as: 
open USTEP 
op p : -> perm  . 
op cp : -> cPerm  . 
op r : -> req . 
eq s' = use4(s). 
  
-- c-use4(s) = false . 
eq useReq(s) = null . 
eq best(s) = emptyLic . 
eq (type3?(labelCP?(find3(useReq(s), best(s) ))) = once ) 
= false . 
eq  type3?(label?(find4(useReq(s) , best(s)))) = once .  
eq (#build2(useReq(s),licIns(s),license(s))== 1) = true . 
eq possLic(s) = emptyLic . 
eq finalLic(s) = emptyLic . 
red  ustep1(s,p) .  
close 
CafeOBJ returned true here so this sub-case is proved. What is left to check is its 
symmetrical case, i.e. when the effective condition holds for the transition rule: 
open USTEP 
op p : -> perm  . 
op cp : -> cPerm  . 
op r : -> req . 
eq s' = use4(s). 
-- c-use4(s) = true . 
eq (useReq(s) = null) = false . 
eq (best(s) = emptyLic) = false  . 
eq type3?(labelCP?(find3(useReq(s), best(s) ))) = once  . 
eq (type3?(label?(find4(useReq(s) , best(s)))) = once) = 
false  .  
eq (# build2(useReq(s) , licIns(s),license(s))== 1) = 
false . 
eq (possLic(s) = emptyLic) = false . 
eq (finalLic(s) = emptyLic) = false  . 
red  ustep1(s,p) .  
close 
CafeOBJ returns again neither true nor false. Instead it returns an expression from 
which we can conclude that it cannot rewrite the predicate color(s,p) = black  
to true or false. So we once must help with the rewriting by splitting this case as: 
open USTEP 
op p : -> perm  . 
op cp : -> cPerm  . 
op r : -> req . 
eq s' = use4(s). 
-- c-use4(s) = false . 
eq (useReq(s) = null) = false . 
eq (best(s) = emptyLic) = false  . 
eq type3?(labelCP?(find3(useReq(s), best(s) ))) = once  . 
eq (type3?(label?(find4(useReq(s) , best(s)))) = once) = 
false  .  
  
eq (# build2(useReq(s) , licIns(s),license(s))== 1) = 
false . 
eq (possLic(s) = emptyLic) = false . 
eq (finalLic(s) = emptyLic) = false  . 
-- CASE SPLITING 
eq color(s ,p) = black . 
red  ustep1(s,p) .  
close 
CafeOBJ returns true for this case but again neither true neither false for the 
symmetrical case. So again we conclude what predicate cannot be further rewritten 
using the given equations. Continuing in the same approach we reach the case 
denoted by the predicates: c-use4(S)/\~color(s,p) = black/\~(p /in 
allowed(s)/\perm3?(useReq(s),find3(useReq(s),best(s)))=p. 
where CafeOBJ has returned true for all the symmetrical sub-cases. Now we could 
continue and split the case more and see what result we would get, but since this is a 
computer human interactive procedure we conclude to the result that not all of these 
equations may hold simultaneously in our specification. So we produced here 
invariant2 and used it as a lemma to discard this case as: 
open USTEP 
op p : -> perm  . 
op cp : -> cPerm  . 
op r : -> req . 
eq s' = use4(s). 
-- c-use4(s) = false . 
eq (useReq(s) = null) = false . 
eq (best(s) = emptyLic) = false  . 
eq type3?(labelCP?(find3(useReq(s), best(s) ))) = once  . 
eq (type3?(label?(find4(useReq(s) , best(s)))) = once) = 
false  .  
eq (# build2(useReq(s) , licIns(s),license(s))== 1) = 
false . 
eq (possLic(s) = emptyLic) = false . 
eq (finalLic(s) = emptyLic) = false  . 
-- CASE SPLITING 
eq (color(s ,p) = black) = false  . 
eq (p /in allowed(s) ) = true . 
eq (perm3?(useReq(s) , find3(useReq(s) , best(s))) = p) = 
false . 
 
red inv2(s ,p) implies  ustep1(s,p) .  
close 
The above proof score returned true as well so this concludes the proof for this 
transition rule. Of course this procedure continued until all the transitions where 
proven to preserve the unless inductive step, and all the lemmas used where in turn 
proved to hold for every reachable state of our OTS (since they are all invariant 
lemmas). Finally eventually step a witness transition was found, use1 in this case. 
  
This concludes the proof of the first ensure property. The same procedure was 
followed successfully for the second eventually property as well and this, together 
with the proofs of the lemmas, concludes the proof of the leads to property.  
In this section we have provided a formal proof that our algorithm does not case 
this loss of rights, by providing a proof as a liveness property in the OTS/CafeOBJ 
framework.  
5.    Conclusions and Work in Progress 
We have redesigned the OMA License Choice Algorithm by simply introducing 
labels on some parts of the licenses. This can be easily done by tweaking the way 
licenses are created since these are written in XML. The extra computational cost has 
been shifted to the creation of licenses. We do not believe that this will cause any 
problems since these licenses are written by computers with much higher 
computational power. We also believe that it will be easier to create automated tools 
that take as input a license written in OMA REL and give as output licenses 
containing these labels. In addition, we have produced some case studies through an 
implementation of the algorithm in Java that we believe demonstrates the benefits of 
this algorithm over the existing one, as well as provide hints that it behaves in a 
correct manner. Of course no matter how many case studies one does it does not 
provide a formal proof of the correctness of the algorithm being tested. To this end we 
have created a specification of this new algorithm as an Observation Transition 
System (OTS) written in CafeOBJ terms. This allowed us to formally prove that the 
algorithm we provide here does not cause the loss of permissions rights discussed. 
The property we verified was a liveness property and to our knowledge this is one of 
the first applications of this technique in a real life problem. We must point out that 
although the algorithm studied and redesigned is originally designed to address the 
decision problem, of what licenses to use when multiple licenses refer to the same 
content, for the mobile environment it could be tweaked to address the same problem 
in different environments since all of these systems use licenses written in RELs that 
have similar constraints and an ordering on these constraints is the bases of these kind 
of algorithms. This work is in the spirit of our previous efforts in the formal 
verification of mobile systems and algorithms [8, 9 and 10].   
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